UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT CHATTANOOGA

LEONARD L. MYREE,)	
Petitioner,)))	Case No. 1:01-cr-88-TRM-1 1:17-cv-51
v.)	
)	Judge Travis R. McDonough
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	
)	
Respondent.)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Petitioner's successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 94.) In it, he challenges the propriety of his base offense level under Section 2K2.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in light of *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the residual provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for unconstitutional vagueness. (*Id.* (suggesting his sentence is no longer valid because Section 4B1.2 is equally vague).)¹

The Guidelines set a general base offense level of fourteen for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). For offenders with one prior conviction for either a "crime of violence" or "controlled substance offense," the base offense level increases to twenty. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). Offenders with two such convictions face a base offense level of twenty-four.

¹ The ACCA mandates a fifteen-year sentence for any felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three prior convictions "for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The statute defines "violent felony" as "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that (1) "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" (the "use-of-physical-force clause"); (2) "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives" (the "enumerated-offense clause"); or (3) "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" (the "residual clause"). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). It was this third clause—the residual clause—that the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional in the *Johnson* decision. 135 S. Ct. at 2563.

On March 6, 2017, the Supreme Court held that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are "not amenable to vagueness challenges." *Beckles v. United States*, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017). As a result, binding authority now dictates that the *Johnson* decision does not provide a basis for vacating, setting aside, or correcting Petitioner's base offense level under Section 2K2.1(a).

In accordance with the foregoing, this Court's stay of the instant action will be **LIFTED** and the successive § 2255 motion (Doc. 94) will be **DENIED** and **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**. The Court will **CERTIFY** that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Therefore, this Court will **DENY** Petitioner leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* on appeal. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 24. Because Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability **SHALL NOT ISSUE**. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). "Controlled substance offense" is defined as any offense "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). "Crime of violence" is defined in an almost identical manner as "violent felony" under the ACCA. *See* U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (adopting identical use-of-force and residual clauses and similar enumerated-offense clause).